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No. 411

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1960

WILLIAM F. BASLOW AND KARL SORENSON, *Petitioners*

v.

STUART ROTHMAN, *et al.*, Individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Members Respectively of, and Constituting the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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INDEX

	Page
Opinions below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions presented	2
Statutes involved	3
Statement	6
A. The facts	6
B. The General Counsel's Position	8
C. The Decision of the District Court	8
D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals	9
Reasons for granting the writ	10
Conclusion	17
Appendix	1a

CITATIONS

CASES:

Air Line Dispatchers, 189 F. 2d 685	15
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 95, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 S. Ct. 33	15
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 65[illegible]	11
Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180	15
Eagle Manufacturing Corp., 112 NLRB 74	12
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 110 NLRB 918, 922	12
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 2 L. ed. 2d 503, 78 S. Ct. 433	15
Hourihan v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 316, 317, 201 F. 2d 187, 188, cert. denied 345 U.S. 930	9, 14
Injection Molding Co., 104 NLRB 639, 645	12

Page

International Typographical Union, 86 NLRB 951, 955-7 12
Lesdom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 15
Local No. 1400 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CLO, 115 NLRB 126 13
Marine Engineers v. NLRB, 202 F. 2d 546 15
Matter of National Maritime Union, 78 NLRB 971, enforced 175 F. 2d 686 (C.A. 2) 12
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 NLRB, 727, 729 ..... 8, 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aircraft Corp. (1953, C.A. 2), 206 F. 2d 235 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Guy S. Atkinson Co., 195 F. 2d 141 15
National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 275 ..... 11, 13
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 66 NLRB 1083 10
Red Spot Electric Co., 191 F. 2d 697 15
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S. Ct. 559 15
Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 NLRB 1487 12
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 88 L. ed. 61, 64 S. Ct. 95 16
Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. & S.S. Clerks 281 U.S. 548, 74 L. ed. 1034, 50 S. Ct. 427 .. 15
United Steel Workers of America, 123 NLRB No. 35 13

STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act (66 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 1001, *et seq.*) 4, 15
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 .. 5
Judicial Code 28 U.S.C. Section 1337 5
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151 *et seq.*)
Section 3(d) 3, 14, 15, 16
Section 7 ..... 3, 10, 11, 15
Section 8(b)(1)(A) 4, 11, 12, 13, 15

Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

Congressional Record:

93 Cong. Rec. 4272 12
93 Cong. Rec. 6859 ..... 10, 11
93 Cong. Rec. 7538 16

National and International Labor Unions in the United States; Bulletin No. 1267, (1959) Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor ... 10

Twenty-second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1957, page 85 13

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v.

STUART ROTHMAN, *et al.*, Individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Members Respectively of, and Constituting the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in the above-entitled cause on June 29, 1960.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix, *infra*, pp. 1a-2a) is reported at 278 F. 2d 866. On petition for rehearing *en banc* filed by Petitioners (Appendix, *infra*, pp. 3a-6a) the Court of Appeals amended its prior opinion on June 17, 1960 (Appendix, *infra*, p. 2a) and by Order entered June 29, 1960 (Appendix p. 7a) denied the petition for rehearing.

JURISDICTION

The first opinion of the Court of Appeals was entered on March 31, 1960 (Appendix *infra*, pp. 1a-2a) and amended by its Order entered on June 17, 1960 (Appendix, *infra*, p. 2a) and the Petitioners' petition for rehearing *en banc*, timely filed on April 15, 1960 (Appendix *infra*, pp. 3a-6a) was denied by Order of the Court filed on June 29, 1960. (Appendix *infra*, p. 7a)

This Petition is timely filed and the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1) and Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether employees, who are members of a labor organization which does not have an agreement requiring membership therein as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, have the right to refrain from taking part in a strike or other activities of such labor organization, as guaranteed to them by Section 7 of said Act.

2. Whether the proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of that Act permits a labor organization to prescribe rules, other than those with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein, which may have a restraining or coercive effect upon employees' exercise of Section 7 rights.

3. Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to review the arbitrary or illegal refusal of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to issue a complaint of unfair labor practices.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes which this case involves are the National Labor Relations Act (61 Stat. 136, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151 *et seq.*); the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237 as amended, 5 U.S.C. Section 1001 *et seq.*); the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. Section 2201) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1337.

The pertinent provisions of the respective statutes are as follows:

National Labor Relations Act:

> Sec. 3(d). "There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board (other than trial examiners and legal assistants to Board members) and over the officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under Section 10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law."

> Sec. 7. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3)."

Sec. 8. (b) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: *Provided*, That this paragraph shall not impair the rights of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . ."

The Administrative Procedure Act:

Sec. 10. Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion—

(a) RIGHT OF REVIEW—Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.

(b) FORM AND VENUE OF ACTION—The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibiting or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.

(c) REVIEWABLE ACTS—Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review . . .

* * * * * * * * *

(e) SCOPE OF REVIEW—So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court

shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial *de novo* by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, Sec. 2201.

"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."

Title 28, U.S.C., section 1337.

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under

any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."

STATEMENT

A. The Facts

Petitioners Bandlow and Sorenson were employees of the Allen Bradley Company, and members of Local 78, Tool and Die Makers Lodge of the International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO. (R. 3).

A collective bargaining agreement existed between the Company and the Union, covering an approximate 90 tool room employees, including petitioners (R. 4) until September 1, 1956, and when the parties failed in arriving at a new agreement, the Union initiated a strike at the plant and established picket lines in and around its entrances.

The collective bargaining agreement which had been in existence immediately prior thereto, did not contain any union security provision requiring membership of the employees in the Union as a condition of employment. (R. 4).

Petitioner Bandlow at no time took part in any of the picket activities during the strike, and continued his active employment at the plant uninterruptedly. (R. 5).

Petitioner Sorenson, on the other hand, at first did take some part in the strike activities of the Union, but then abandoned those activities over the protest of members of the Union, and returned to his job at the plant while the strike continued its progress. (R. 7).

On the first working day that the strike was in progress, Bandlow was questioned by a member of

the local Union's bargaining committee who was on the picket line, as to why he was reporting for work. The following day, this same picket, two other members of the bargaining committee and an International representative of the Union went to Bandlow's home, where it was suggested to Bandlow (1) that he stop work, (2) that he quit his job and go to work for another company. Upon his refusal to do either, the International representative threatened that the Union would bring a charge against him and fine him $500.00 for refusing to go on strike, and would furthermore "blackball" him against getting a job anywhere else. (R. 4, 5, 19). Bandlow, nevertheless, refused to go out on strike.

Later in September of 1956, Bandlow filed a charge of unfair labor practices with the regional director of the National Labor Relations Board, charging the Union with violating Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act by threatening him with a fine and other coercive action because he had elected not to take part in the strike (R. 5), and the charges were further substantiated by his counsel, by letter of September 28, 1956 (R. 18) sent to the regional director.

Thereafter, on October 31, 1956, Bandlow was advised by the Union that he had been fined $100.00 (R. 17) and Sorenson was similarly advised, as were twelve other employees who are not part of the instant case. Both refused to pay the $100.00 fine assessed, and the Union filed an action against both in the Civil Court for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, to collect it. (R. 6, 7).

By correspondence extending from September 28, 1956, to October 4, 1957 (R. 18-29) petitioners' counsel

was advised by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board of his refusal to issue a complaint of unfair labor practices against the Union.

B. The General Counsel's Position

The position of the General Counsel in refusing to issue a complaint of unfair labor practices against the Union in this case "involving the imposition by the Union of a fine on its members who crossed its picket line and returned to work during the strike:" was set forth in his letter to petitioners' counsel (R. 28-29) as follows:

> "Although Section 7 of the Act gives an employee an opportunity to join or refrain from joining in union activity, the proviso to 8 (b) (1) (A) allows the Union to prescribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or retention of membership therein. In this connection the Board relying in part on the legislative history of the Act, has held that 'The imposition of a fine on a union member is considered an internal affair within the meaning of the proviso.' (See *Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.*, 109 NLRB 727 at 729). In view of this and, particularly, since there was no substantial evidence that the action taken by the Union caused or was intended to cause the Company to discriminate against the charging parties and no showing that their tenure of employment had been affected in any manner, the General Counsel concluded that a violation of the Act had not been established."

C. The Decision of the District Court

Petitioners alleged jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia over the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Mandatory Injunction (R. 2), under the Labor Management Rela-

tions Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C., Sections 151 *et seq.*; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C., Section 1001 *et seq.*; Sections 10(a), 10(b), 10(c) and 10(e); the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C., Section 2201, 28 U.S.C., Section 1337; and the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8 thereof and Amendment V thereto.

By memorandum opinion (R. 93) the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint "on the grounds that the Court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the complaint fails to state a a claim upon which relief can be granted.

> *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board, et al.*, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 316, 201 F. 2d 187 (1952).
> *National Labor Relations Board* v. *Lewis*, 249 F. 2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957)."

D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. 1291, 1294.

By its Order of March 31, 1960, amended June 17, 1960 (Appendix *infra* p. 2a), the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the District Court, holding "It 'has no power to order the General Counsel to issue a complaint and no power to require the Board to issue an order which is not before the Board.'" Citing *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 316, 317, 201 F. 2d 187, 188, cert. denied 345 U.S. 930.

The Court did not answer the first two questions presented to it for decision, identical to questions (1) and (2) presented to this Court *supra* p. 2.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioners urge that this Court should grant certiorari in this case because the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of Federal law in a manner which completely negates one of the basic concepts of the National Labor Relations Act, and which question has not been, but should be, settled by this Court; and has ignored two important questions presented to it for decision, neither of which has been ruled upon by this Court; but should be.

It is appropriate that this Court resolve these questions, because the holding of the Court of Appeals adversely affects the basic rights, under the Act, of every one of an approximate 17,000,000 unionized employees in the United States. (See National and International Labor Unions in the United States, Bulletin No. 1267, 1959, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor).

Addressing ourselves to the questions in the order in which they are presented to this Court, Section 7 of the Act very clearly provides that employees shall have the right to join and take part in union activities, and shall also have the right to *refrain* from any or all of such activities. Their right to refrain from taking part in such activities was afforded by Taft-Hartley amendment in 1947, and, according to the late Senator Taft, one of the sponsors of the bill, the new language merely made mandatory an interpretation "which the Board itself had already arrived at administratively . . . Moreover, the Board itself has held that a right to refrain from the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 was always implicit in the Wagner Act. (See *Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.*, 66 NLRB 1083)." 93 Cong. Rec. 6859.

No clearer reason can be given for the inclusion of the language giving employees the right to refrain from taking part in concerted activities than that stated by Senator Taft in the same reference, when he said: "The reason for its inclusion was that similar language had appeared in the House bill and since section 8(b)(1) of the Senate bill, which was retained by the conferees, made it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations to restrain or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed them in section 7, the House conferees insisted that there be express language in section 7, which would make the prohibition contained in section 8(b)(1) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or a picket line."

Mr. Justice Brennan speaking for the majority of this Court, as recently as March of 1960, in *NLRB* v. *Local Union No. 639*, 362 U.S. 275 stated:

> "However, the Taft-Hartley Act added another right of employees also guaranteed protection, namely, the right to refrain from joining a union, except as that right might be affected by an agreement authorized in § 8(a)(3). Thus tension exists between the two rights of employees protected by § 7—their right to form, join or assist labor organizations, and their right to refrain from doing so." See also Mr. Chief Justice Warren's statement in *Automobile Workers* v. *Russell*, 356 U.S. 634, 655: "Since the right to refrain from concerted activities is protected by § 7 of the Act, a § 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice is inherent in the wrong of which plaintiff complains, and the Federal Act offers machinery to correct it.'"

Inasmuch as employees have the "protected" right to refrain from concerted activities, petitioners here

had such a right, subject only to any exceptions thereto which the Act might provide. The General Counsel argues that another such exception is implicit in the proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act which states that the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own *rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership* therein shall not be impaired. This argument must be rejected. The proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) relates to acquisition or retention of membership alone, and nothing else. It relates, in the words of Senator Holland, who introduced the proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) in Congress, to "the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules of membership either with respect to beginning or terminating membership." 93 Cong. Rec. 4272.

The position of petitioners' here was the identical position adhered to by the Board for a number of years, and by the courts[1] until the Board's decision in *Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.*, 109 NLRB 727 (1954), in which the Board held that a union fine against an employee for failure to attend union meetings during a strike and failure to engage in picketing was an activity outside the scope of the unfair labor practice prohibition contained in Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, and was governed by the proviso to the above section. The Board posited its decision in that case upon the purported legislative history governing such a con-

[1] *Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.*, 110 NLRB 918, 922; *Eagle Manufacturing Corp.*, 112 NLRB 74; *International Typographical Union*, 86 NLRB 951, 955-7; *Matter of National Maritime Union*, 78 NLRB 971, enforced 175 F. 2d 686 (C.A. 2); *Sunset Line & Twine Co.*, 79 NLRB 1487; *NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp.* (1953, C.A. 2), 206 F. 2d 235; *Injection Molding Co.*, 104 NLRB 639, 645 (1953).

struction and although petitioners in this case pointed out conclusively that the Board's reference to the legislative history was erroneous, since it pertained to an entirely different section of the Act (R. 79), nevertheless the General Counsel proceeded to arrive at the same result.

This interpretation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) has never been reviewed by the courts, and therefore should be reviewed by this Court, especially in view of the fact that subsequent decisions by the Board itself confirmed the position for which petitioners here contend. See *United Steel Workers of America*, 123 NLRB No. 35; *Local No. 1400 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO*, 115 NLRB 126. See also Twenty-second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1957, page 85. Petitioners position "that the Board's interpretation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) finds support neither in the way Congress structured Section 8(b) nor in the legislative history of Section 8(b)(1)(A).", has best been explained by this Court itself in *NLRB* v. *Local Union No. 639*, 362 U.S. 275.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, by leaving unanswered petitioners' questions concerning their "protected" right to refrain from taking part in concerted activities, free from union coercion not based upon rules with respect to acquisition or retention of membership therein, stands for the proposition that the General Counsel enjoys complete freedom from judicial restraint. Further, the employees have been given no right whatever by the Act except to the extent that the General Counsel, in his sole discretion, determines to proceed on any employee's behalf. This Court

never having ruled on the important question concerning the status of the General Counsel, the Court of Appeals cited with approval for its holding, its own decision in the case of *Hourihan* v. *NLRB*, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 316, 317, 201 F. 2d 187, 188, cert. denied 345 U.S. 930.

That case involved the evaluation of evidence before the Court, and under the circumstances there present the Court had refused to order the General Counsel to act, holding at the same time, in footnote 4, "We need not here canvass whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a court can correct an abuse of discretion by the General Counsel in failing to issue a complaint." Petitioners contend that in the instant case, the facts before the General Counsel (R. 18-29) being clear and uncontroverted, and constituting prima facie evidence of a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act by the Union, no room was left for the General Counsel to make any evaluation of the evidence, and his failure to proceed to issue a complaint charging unfair labor practices constituted an illegal and arbitrary refusal to take action made mandatory by the plain wording of the statute, and is subject to correction by the judiciary.

Albeit the statute gives the General Counsel "final authority on behalf of the Board in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints," petitioners contend that the reference to the "final authority" of the General Counsel cloaks him with an administrative, and not a judicial, finality. To hold otherwise is to say that the entire purposes of the Act may be thwarted by the General Counsel for whatever reason, or for no reason at all, and irrespective of however arbitrary or illegal.

Petitioners hardly believe that such a result was intended by the Congress. As this Court stated in *Leedom* v. *Kyne*, 358 U.S. 184, "This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of the rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers;" Cf. *Harmon* v. *Brucker*, 355 U.S. 579, 2 L. ed. 2d 503, 78 S. Ct. 433; *Stark* v. *Wickard*, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S. Ct. 559; *American School of Magnetic Healing* v. *McAnnulty*, 187 U.S. 95, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 S. Ct. 33. Where a statute clearly shows that Congress has given rights to employees, as it obviously intended by its correlative amendments to Section 7 and the enactment of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) in the Taft-Hartley Act, this Court should hold that the Congress intended those rights to be enforced and encounter no difficulty in fulfilling the congressional purposes. *Texas & N.O.R. Co.* v. *Brotherhood of R. & S. S. Clerks*, 281 U.S. 548, 74 L. ed. 1034, 50 S. Ct. 427.

There can be no question that the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable to the National Labor Relations Act as amended. See *Air Line Dispatchers*, 189 F. 2d 685; *Red Spot Electric Co.*, 191 F. 2d 697; *NLRB* v. *Guy S. Atkinson Co.*, 195 F. 2d 141; *Marine Engineers* v. *NLRB*, 202 F. 2d 546. See also *Brownell* v. *We Shung*, 352 U.S. 180.

Petitioners contend that under the statute the General Counsel's decisions are subject to judicial review, whether pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act or to the original equity jurisdiction of the courts. This was pointed out by Senator Taft during the debates preceding the passage of the Act when, with reference to Section 3 (d) of the Act he stated "it is asserted that this is inconsistent with the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act and that it places a tremendous amount of unreviewable power in the hands of a single official * * * So far as having unfettered discretion is concerned, he, of course, must respect the rules of decision of the Board and of the courts." 93 Cong Rec. 7001. Similarly, he stated on the floor of the Senate just prior to the passage of the Act over the Presidential veto: "Under this bill, the counsel will have the right to make the decision as between employer and employee: but his decision will be subject to the judicial decision of the Board and, above the Board, the Courts; and we have given the Courts greater power to look into the decisions of the Board and to provide for the redress of any injustice." 93 Cong. Rec. 7538.

It is submitted that to afford judicial review under the circumstances present in this case is consonant with this Court's holding in *Switchmen's Union* v. *National Mediation Board*, 320 U.S. 297, 88 L. ed. 61, 64 S. Ct. 95, to the effect that if the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts would result in the sacrifice or obliteration of a right the Congress had created, the inference would be strong that the Congress had intended that the statutory provisions governing the equity jurisdiction of those courts should control. To do otherwise is to say that the Congress intended to confer upon the employees in question certain rights, but to leave the enjoyment of those rights unenforceable at the whim of the General Counsel.

Inasmuch as the three questions presented to this Court involve important questions of federal law which have not been decided by this Court, but should be because of their importance in carrying out the statutory purposes and the orderly administration of the Act, it is earnestly suggested that certiorari be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated this petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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September, 1960

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Filed March 31, 1960

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15279

WILLIAM F. BANDLOW and KARL SORENSON, *Appellants*

v.

STUART ROTHMAN, *et al.*, individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Members, respectively, of and constituting the National Labor Relations Board, *Appellees*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

---

Decided March 31, 1960

Mr. Karl M. Dollak for appellants.

Mr. Duane B. Beeson, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, of the bar of the Supreme Court of California, *pro hac vice*, by special leave of court, with whom *Messrs. Thomas J. McDermott*, Associate General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, and *Marcel Mallet-Prevost*, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, were on the brief, for appellees. *Mr. Richard J. Scupi*, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before EDGERTON, BAZELON, and BURGER, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM: Appellants asked the District Court to require the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to issue a complaint charging unfair labor

practices. They also sought to compel the Board to set aside the General Counsel's refusal. This appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court was clearly right. It "has no power to order the General Counsel to issue a complaint and no power to require the Board to issue an order in a matter which is not before the Board." *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 316, 317, 201 F. 2d 187, 188, *cert. denied* 345 U.S. 930.

Affirmed.

Filed March 31, 1960

Judgment

This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof It is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the District Court appealed from in this cause be, and it is hereby, affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

Dated: March 31, 1960.

Filed June 17, 1960

Order

It is ORDERED by the court that the last sentence of the opinion filed herein March 31, 1960, reading as follows:

> This is still true if, as appellants allege, the General Counsel has misconstrued the statute.

is hereby stricken.

PER CURIAM.

Dated: June 17, 1960

Petition for Rehearing En Banc

Come now the appellants Bandlow and Sorenson, and petition this Court to permit a rehearing before the Court *en banc* of its judgment, entered on March 31, 1960, affirming in a per curiam opinion the order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissing the complaint on the grounds that that Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

In support thereof the following is respectfully submitted:

1. The Court has the statutory power to order rehearings *en banc*, 28 U.S.C. 46(c); Rule 26(a), of the Rules of this Court.

2. In view of the importance of a definitive decision by this Court on the questions presented to it in the Brief for Appellants, to the proper administration of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, it is respectfully suggested that inasmuch as the Court in its judgment answers only the third of three questions, and that the judgment is not dispositive of the first two questions presented, consideration by the full Court is warranted.

In its judgment of March 31, 1960, this Court posited its decision solely upon the case of *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 316, 317, 201 F. 2d 187, 188, *cert. denied* 345 U.S. 930, which case had been decided on the basis of a permitted exercise of discretion by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board.

In the instant case appellants contend and, we respectfully submit, showed, that on the basis of the facts involved, the General Counsel ignored the plain language of the statute, as well as the facts which were admitted by the appellees, and refused to issue a complaint of unfair

labor practices, in complete derogation of the statutory mandate upon him to do so under those circumstances.

Appellants contend that in the case at hand, the facts being admitted, and the plain wording of the statute guaranteeing to the employees "the protected right . . . to work in the face of a strike. . . ." (J.A. 52-53), no room existed for the exercise of discretion by the General Counsel and it was mandatory for him to issue the complaint requested.

This Court in its judgment of March 31, 1960, made no reference whatever to its footnote in the *Hourihan* case in which it had stated:

> "We need not here canvass whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a court can correct an abuse of discretion by the General Counsel in failing to issue a complaint."

Thus it would appear, without this Court having so stated, that its judgment in the instant case stands for the proposition that a Court has no power whatever, under any circumstances, to order the General Counsel to proceed. The Court stated, in the last sentence of its judgment that "This is still true if, as appellants allege, the General Counsel has misconstrued the statute."

In view of the fact that the National Labor Relations Board, in its 23rd Annual Report, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1958, stated, at page 82, that ". . . Section 8(b)(1)(A) is clear and requires no construction, . . .", it is difficult to fathom how the General Counsel, who theoretically is to be guided by the opinions of the Board, can take refuge in an alleged misconstruction of the statute.

Appellants respectfully contend that a combination of (1) the undisputed facts in the instant case, (2) the legislative history of the Act, (3) the policy of the statute, and (4) the later decisions of the Board itself all require issuance by the General Counsel of a complaint of unfair labor

practice charges, and that his refusal to do so under all of the circumstances constitutes not an exercise of discretion, where discretion there can be none, but rather illegal inaction on his part where positive action is required.

As has been repetitiously pointed out, section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C., Secs. 151 *et seq.*), "guarantees" to employees the right to refrain from taking part in union activities, except to the extent that they may be required to join a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).

Additionally, section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, with the proviso that a labor organization may prescribe its own rules with respect to the *acquisition* or *retention* of membership therein. It seems obvious to appellants that the term "acquisition or retention of membership" applies only to the beginning or terminating of membership and certainly does not apply to union rules pertaining to anything else.

The Court's failure to answer questions 1 and 2, presented for decision in the Brief for Appellants, holds in abeyance a vitally needed clarification which appellants sincerely feel is required for the proper administration of an Act which affects millions of employees who are members of labor organizations and subject to the interpretation of the Act.

The effect of this Court's judgment as it now stands, is that no employees who are members of a labor organization, have any right whatever to refrain from taking part in a strike or other union activities, if the labor organization of which they happen to be members, prescribes rules which require them to take part in such activities.

Appellants respectfully suggest that neither the plain wording of the Act, nor its policy, call for such a result.

By the same token, appellants respectfully contend that the plain wording of the Act, as well as its legislative history, do not permit a labor organization to prescribe rules which have a restraining or coercive effect upon employees' exercise of rights guaranteed them under section 7 of the Act, other than rules relating solely to the acquisition or retention or the "beginning or terminating" of membership.

In view of the dearth of judicial pronouncement dispositive of questions 1 and 2 included in appellants' STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED in their Brief before this Court, it is respectfully submitted that appellants are entitled to a clear declaration by this Court, of their rights under the statute.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully suggested that the Court's discretion would most appropriately be exercised by the order of a rehearing *en banc*.

/s/ KARL M. DOLLAK
Karl M. Dollak
7424 Wisconsin Avenue
Bethesda 14, Maryland
Attorney for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

It is hereby certified that this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

/s/ KARL M. DOLLAK
Karl M. Dollak

Filed June 29, 1960

Order

On consideration of appellants' petition for rehearing en banc, it is

ORDERED by the court that the petition is denied,

PER CURIAM.

FILE COPY

No. 411

FILED
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JAMES R. BROWNING, Clerk

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1960

WILLIAM F. BANDLOW AND KARL SORENSON,
PETITIONERS

v.

STUART ROTHMAN, ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GENERAL COUNSEL, CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS RESPECTIVELY OF AND CONSTITUTING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

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Solicitor General,
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INDEX

	Page
Opinions below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Question presented	2
Statutes involved	2
Statement	3
Argument	5
Conclusion	10

CITATIONS

Cases:

Anthony v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 204 F. 2d 832	7
Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454	6
General Drivers, Inc. v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 179 F. 2d 492	7
Hourihan v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 201 F. 2d 187, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 930	5, 6
LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. *Wisconsin Employment Relations Board*, 336 U.S. 18	9
Leedom v. *Kyne*, 358 U.S. 184	9
Lincourt v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 170 F. 2d 306	7
Local 248, UAW v. *Wisconsin Board*, 46 LRRM 3056	8
Macauley v. *Waterman S.S. Corp.*, 327 U.S. 540	9
Manhattan Construction Co. v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 198 F. 2d 320	7
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 109 NLRB 727	8
National Labor Relations Board v. *Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.*, 318 U.S. 9	6
National Labor Relations Board v. *Local Union No. 639*, 362 U.S. 274	8
Panama Canal Co. v. *Grace Line, Inc.*, 356 U.S. 309	7
Radio Officers' Union v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 347 U.S. 17	8
Schilling v. *Rogers*, 363 U.S. 666	9
Skelly Oil Co. v. *Phillips Co.*, 339 U.S. 667	9

Statute: Page

National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, *et seq.*)
Section 3(d) 6
Section 7 7
Section 8(b)(1)(A) 4, 7, 8
Section 10(b) 2, 5
Section 10(e) 3, 6
Section 10(f) 3, 6

Miscellaneous:

93 Cong. Rec. 4193, 4433, 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (G.P.O., 1948), 1097, 1200 8
93 Cong. Rec. 6859, 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (G.P.O., 1948), 1622-1623 6

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1960

No. 444

WILLIAM F. BANDLOW AND KARL SORENSON,
PETITIONERS

v.

STUART ROTHMAN, ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GENERAL COUNSEL, CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS RESPECTIVELY OF AND CONSTITUTING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the district court dismissing the complaint is set forth at J.A. 93.[1] The opinion of the court below (Pet. 1a-2a), affirming the district court's order, is reported at 278 F. 2d 866.

[1] "J.A." refers to the portions of the record printed as a joint appendix to the briefs in the court below.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on March 31, 1960 (Pet. 2a). A petition for rehearing *en banc* was denied on June 29, 1960 (Pet. 7a). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 27, 1960. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court lacked power to review and set aside the determination of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint on the charges filed by petitioners.

STATUTES INVOLVED

In addition to the statutory provisions set forth at pp. 3-6 of the Petition, the relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, *et seq.*) are as follows:

Sec. 10. * * *

> (b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any * * * unfair labor partice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint * * *.

(e) The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief of restraining order, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28 * * *.

(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside. * * *

STATEMENT

Petitioners are employees of the Allen Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and members of Local 78, Tool and Die Makers Lodge of the International Association of Machinists (J.A. 3). In September 1956, the Union called a strike over contract terms, and established picket lines at the Company's plant. When petitioners declined to participate in the strike, the Union fined them, and there-

after brought suit in the state court to enforce the fines (J.A. 4-5, 6-7).

Plaintiffs filed charges with the Regional Director of the Board alleging that the Union's reprisals against them constituted restraint and coercion in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Regional Director, after investigation of the charges, declined to issue complaints thereon (J.A. 5-6, 7-8). This action was appealed to the General Counsel of the Board, who sustained the Regional Director. The General Counsel explained the basis of his decision as follows (J.A. 29):

> Although Section 7 of the Act gives an employee an opportunity to join or refrain from joining in union activity, the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A) allows the Union to prescribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or retention of membership therein. In this connection the Board . . . has held that "The imposition of a fine on a union member is considered an internal affair within the meaning of the proviso." (See *Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.*, 109 NLRB 727 at 729.) In view of this and, particularly, since there was no substantial evidence that the action taken by the Union caused or was intended to cause the Company to discriminate against the charging parties and no showing that their tenure of employment had been affected in any manner, the General Counsel concluded that a violation of the Act had not been established.

Petitioners thereupon brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting that the General Counsel of the Board be required to issue

complaints based on their charges, and that a declaratory judgment be made that the Act prohibits the levying and enforcement of fines by labor unions against their members for an exercise of their right to refrain from participating in strike action (J.A. 2-17). After hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (J.A. 93). The court of appeals, in a *per curiam* opinion (Pet. 1a-2a), affirmed the district court's order. Quoting from its earlier decision in *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 201 F. 2d 187, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 930, which involved a similar proceeding, the court stated that the district court " 'has no power to order the General Counsel to issue a complaint and no power to require the Board to issue an order in a matter which is not before the Board' " (Pet. 1a-2a).[2]

ARGUMENT

The decision below is correct, and no conflict of decisions is shown. No issue warranting review by this Court is presented.

1. Section 10(b) of the Act vests the Board or its agent with broad discretionary power with respect to the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints.

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[2] In its original opinion, the court had added: "This is still true if, as appellants allege, the General Counsel has misconstrued the statute." The court subsequently deleted this sentence (Pet. 2a).

See *National Labor Relations Board* v. *Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.*, 318 U.S. 9, 18. Section 3(d) confers this power upon the General Counsel of the Board, providing that he shall have "final authority on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under Section 10 and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board." The Act, although it provides for review in the courts of appeals of final Board orders entered in unfair labor practice proceedings (Section 10(e) and (f)), makes no provision for review of the General Counsel's threshold determination of whether an unfair labor practice proceeding should be initiated.

The congressional intent to preclude judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions respecting the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints is not only clear from the language of the statute, but also from Congress' visualization of the General Counsel's role as analogous to that of a district attorney in deciding whether to institute a prosecution.[3] Accordingly, whether instituted in the district court, as here, or in the court of appeals, suits to obtain review of the General Counsel's decision not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint have consistently been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. *Hourihan* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 201 F.

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[3] See Senator Taft's statement at 93 Cong. Rec. 6859, 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (G.P.O., 1948), 1622-1623; cf. *Confiscation Cases*, 7 Wall. 454, 458-459.

2d 187, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 930; *Anthony* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 204 F. 2d 832, 834 (C.A. 6); *Manhattan Construction Co.* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 198 F. 2d 320 (C.A. 10); *General Drivers, Inc.* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 179 F. 2d 492, 494-495 (C.A. 10); *Lincourt* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 170 F. 2d 306, 307 (C.A. 1).

2. The fact that the unfair labor practice charges here involved a question of statutory interpretation, rather than an evaluation of evidence, does not, as petitioners contend (Pet. 10-14), require a different conclusion. If, as we have shown, Congress has not given the courts supervisory or review authority over the General Counsel's determinations respecting the issuance of complaints, the character of the question presented by the charge cannot alter the result. In any event, mandamus or its equivalent would not lie to overturn the General Counsel's determination in this case, even if it were reviewable, for the statutory problem presented is not one in which "the agency is clearly derelict in failing to act," but rather one in which "the very construction of the statute is a distinct and profound exercise of discretion." *Panama Canal Co.* v. *Grace Line, Inc.*, 356 U.S. 309, 318.

Although Section 8(b)(1)(A) bars a union from restraining or coercing an employee in the exercise of his Section 7 rights, it does not "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein". A problem is consequently pre-

sented as to how to reconcile these competing objectives. The resolution made by the Board, which is supported by the legislative history,[4] is that unions may seek to enforce union rules or policies by fines or any other means, so long as no attempt is made to affect the non-conforming member's employment status. *Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.*, 109 NLRB 727, 728.[5] The General Counsel properly applied this principle here. The obligation to join in strike activity was required by a union membership rule applicable to petitioners, and, since there was no evidence of any attempt to enforce that rule by obtaining petitioners' discharge, the action taken by the Union remained within the area of internal union policy and hence was not barred by Section 8(b)(1)(A) as construed by the Board.

3. Petitioners' reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the general equity powers of the district court (Pet. 4-6, 15-16) to establish jurisdiction in this case is un-

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[4] See 93 Cong. Rec. 4193, 4433, 2 Legislative History, 1097, 1200. See also *Radio Officers' Union* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 347 U.S. 17, 40-41.

[5] See, also, *Local 248, UAW* v. *Wisconsin Board*, 46 LRRM 3056 (Wis.S.Ct., October 4, 1960). Contrary to petitioners' suggestion (Pet. 12-13), the Board's decision in *Minneapolis Star* does not represent an abberation. The other Board cases cited by petitioners are distinguishable from the situation here, for they involve either violence or threats thereof, or situations in which the union enforced its policy by procuring the employee's discharge. Similarly inapposite is *National Labor Relations Board* v. *Local Union No. 639*, 362 U.S. 274 (Pet. 13), which involved the question of whether Section 8(b)(1)(A) barred peaceful picketing for recognition by a minority union.

availing. None of these statutory provisions confers jurisdiction where, as in the present case, the regulatory statute in question has precluded jurisdiction. See *Schilling* v. *Rogers*, 363 U.S. 666; *Skelly Oil Co.* v. *Phillips Co.*, 339 U.S. 667, 671; *Macauley* v. *Waterman S. S. Corp.*, 327 U.S. 540, 545.

Nor are petitioners aided by *Leedom* v. *Kyne*, 358 U.S. 184 (Pet. 15). That case, unlike the instant one, involved a decision by the Board which was reached after formal hearing and which finally determined "legal rights and relationships" (*LaCrosse Telephone Corp.* v. *Wisconsin Employment Relations Board*, 336 U.S. 18, 24). The inference that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of such a determination cannot as readily be drawn as it can with respect to a prosecutor's determination not to institute proceedings at all. Moreover, there, unlike here, it was clear to the Court that the Board action had violated the express terms of the statute.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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STUART ROTHMAN,
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DOMINICK L. MANOLI,
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October 1960.

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No. 111

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949

William C. Bandowski and Kate Sobieski, *Petitioners*,

v.

Sinclair Refining Co., Individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Member Respectively of, and Constituting the National Labor Relations Board,

REPLY OF PETITIONERS TO BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Additional Reasons for Granting Writ of Certiorari	1
Reply to Respondents' Brief in Opposition	3
Conclusion	7

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 4

Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 109 NLRB 727 .. 6

NLRB v. Allen-Bradley Co., 127 NLRB No. 8, C.C.A. 7th Circuit, No. 13042, 28 LW 2546 2

U.A.W. Local 248 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Nos. 59 and 60; 29 LW 2167 2

MISCELLANEOUS:

93 Cong. Rec. 6859 5

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1960

No. 444

WILLIAM F. BANDLOW AND KAYE SORENSON, *Petitioners*

v.

STUART ROTHMAN, *et al.*, Individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Members Respectively of, and Constituting the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

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REPLY OF PETITIONERS TO BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners are impelled to invite the attention of the Court to the following additional facts which they sincerely believe militate for this Court granting the Petition for Certiorari herein filed:

This cause had its inception when the union fined petitioners and numerous other employees for refusing

to take part in strike activities, and thereafter brought suit in a state court to enforce the fines.

A second cause currently in the Courts and having its inception in the same incident, is *U.A.W. Local 248 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board*, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Nos. 59 and 60, 29LW2167, presently pending decision after rehearing. The issue involved is whether the Taft Hartley Act deprives the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board of jurisdiction to prevent unions from threatening members with fines if they refuse to take part in strike activities called by the union.

A third cause currently pending in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and which similarly had its inception in the same incident as this cause, is *N.L.R.B. v. Allen-Bradley Co.*, (127 NLRB No. 8,) No. 13042. The case involves an enforcement proceeding, the issue being whether the employer's insistence that the union agree not to discipline, discharge or fine any employee for exercising his Taft-Hartley Act right to engage in union activities or to refrain from such activities constitutes an unlawful refusal to bargain. 28 LW 2546.

Patently, if this Court were to grant petitioners prayer for a Writ of Certiorari in this cause, so that the questions which are important for the orderly administration of the Act and the fulfilment of its purposes could be answered by this Court, such a multiplicity of suits, both State and Federal, would be obviated.

The alternative is to leave unanswered the three questions presented to this Court in the petition for

certiorari, plus the additional questions already presented for decision in the lower State and Federal forums by the two cases immediately above cited, for which no precedents have yet provided an answer. Additionally, until this Court provides an answer, every employee who is a union member is subject to being deprived of the emoluments of his labors, by having them confiscated in whole or in part by his union whenever it wishes to "fine" such a member who refuses to take part in any union activity in which a union dictates he must take part.

The alternative to a final decision by this Court on the questions presented is for every union to insure that its rules provide that the proper conduct of its "internal affairs" requires every member to take part in any and all affairs it may enumerate under penalty for their failure to do so. Absent a decision by this Court on the questions presented, the posture of the decision of the lower court in this case sanctions such a result.

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Coming now briefly to a reply to respondents' Brief in Opposition we believe the Court's attention should be invited to the following:

Petitioners have presented for consideration by this Court three questions dealing respectively with (1) employees' rights under Section 7, and (2) Section 8b(1)(A) of the Act, and (3) the alleged complete immunity of the General Counsel of the Board from any judicial restraint or correction. (Pet. 2). Therefore, respondent's reference to only the third of the three questions, as being the only question presented for decision, is erroneous. (B.R. 2).

Surely an answer by this Court to the third of the three questions presented, namely, the jurisdiction of the federal courts over the General Counsel, would not necessarily be dispositive of the other two questions presented. By the same token, an answer to either, or both, of the first two questions presented, would not necessarily be dispositive of the third. Certainly, were this Court to declare, in answer to the third question, that no provision existed to permit review of any decision of the General Counsel, however, arbitrary or illegal, it would not of necessity follow that employees have no rights whatever under Section 7 of the Act, nor that unions may prescribe *any* rules, other than those with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership, irrespective of how coercive or restraining of employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights such rules may be.

The brief for respondents (B.R. 6, footnote 3) refers this Court to a statement made by Senator Taft during the congressional debates, allegedly in partial support of their contention that it was the "congressional intent to preclude judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions—." The other foot alleged to support their contention is that such intent is "clear from the language of the statute." This purported clarity is not sufficiently identified for ease of reference, and would not seem, therefore, to comport with this Court's requirements, as outlined in *Brownell v. We Shung*, 352 U.S. 180 in which it held:

> "—to darken the meaning of the word 'final' as used by Congress by giving it chameleonic characteristics is to indulge in choplogic. * * * Furthermore,—such a 'cutting off' of judicial review 'would run counter to section 10 and section 12 of

the Administrative Procedure Act.' 349 U.S. at 51 'Exceptions from the—Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed,' *Marcello v. Bonds*, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955), and *unless made by clear language or supersedure* the expanded mode of review granted by that Act cannot be modified. We therefore conclude that the finality provision of the 1952 Act—refers only to administrative finality." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229.

The reference to Senator Taft's statement seems equally inept in view of its content which stated:

"Section 7. In this section guaranteeing the right of employees to self-organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, there has been inserted the language 'and shall also have the right to refrain from any and all of such activities * * *.' It is contended that the inclusion of the new language destroys collective bargaining and legalizes the device of the yellow-dog contract. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is similar language in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a statute outlawing the yellow-dog contract. Moreover, the Board itself has held that a right to refrain from the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 was always implicit in the Wagner Act. (See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 66 NLRB 1083.) The new language therefore, merely makes mandatory an interpretation which the Board itself had already arrived at administratively. The reason for its inclusion was that similar language had appeared in the House bill and since section 8(b)(1) of the Senate bill, which was retained by the conferees, made it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations to restrain or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed them in section 7, the House conferees insisted that there be express language in Section 7, which would make the pro-

> hibition contained in section 8(b)(4) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or a picket line. 93 Cong. Rec. 6859

In view of the fact that petitioners invited the attention of the Court to this portion of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act in support of their position (P. 10, 11), it is difficult to determine, from a reading of the plain wording of that reference, that respondents can find therein any solace for their position. The language clearly states, in effect, that the language of Section 8(b)(1) of the Act was merely further assurance to prohibit coercive acts by unions against employees who did not wish to join, or did not care to participate in a strike or picket line, as the National Labor Relations Board itself had always held that the right to refrain from the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 of the act had always been implicit in the Wagner Act.

Additionally, in view of the fact that respondents tacitly admitted some time ago, while this cause was pending before the United States District Court of the District of Columbia, (R. 79) that petitioners' contention (R. 47-51) was correct, namely that the alleged legislative history relied on for support by the Board in the *Minneapolis Star* case, (109 NLRB 727), and thereafter by the General Counsel in support of his position of inaction in the present cause, pertained strictly to the enactment of section 8(a)(3)(B) of the Act, and not to section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, it is difficult to divine at this point respondents search for support of its position in the alleged legislative history of the enactment.

It has been petitioners' contention that where statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face it must be applied as written, and that arguments of policy or resort to the legislative history of an enactment become relevant only where the statutory language is not clear or is ambiguous on its face. (R. 61-62). This entire case arose from the refusal of respondents to heed the interdependent guarantees given to employees by sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and by refusing to recognize the language in section 8(b)(1)(A) thereof which permits labor organizations to prescribe its own rules *with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.* The only support to which respondents can point in support of their position is the alleged legislative history, which supports only an entirely different section of the Act and not section 8(b)(1)(A), which is the section involved in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners earnestly pray that this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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November 1960.